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tion for further consideration by Congress.130 These provisions proposed to
shift enforcement to the Department of justice, and a detailed statement of
all activities was to be placed on public record, togetler with copies of all
propaganda material. The loophole left by inability to punish associations
was closed by making their officials responsible for their registration. How-
ever, the possibility remained of a sudden expansion of activity within the
categories still exempted, such as "private, non-political . . . bona-fide
trade", "bona-fide . . . academic or scientific pursuits", or foreign relief.' Tr
The veto message indicated the further dangers of embarrassing the repre-
sentatives of associated nations in the war. But if the President's recom-
mendations for broader discretion to the Attorney General are accepted,
a vigorous administration of the Act' 38 along these lines can contribute to
a careful evaluation of American relations with all foreign governments.
The breakdown of public tolerance may distract energy into a revived
witch-hunt; but a careful application of existing legal techniques can protect
military recruiting and morale, and yet provide the information and the
atmosphere necessary for intelligent public discussion of the issues of the
war and the peace.
LEGAL AND ECONOMIC ASPECTS OF WARTIME
PRICE CONTROL
PERSPECTIVE ON INFLATION AND PRICEr FLXING
DIRECT price fixing' is one of a series of governmental measures'-' designed
to prevent the social and economic evils accompanying wartime inflationary
expansion of money income. Vartime inflation is an economic plague partly
because all prices and all incomes do not rise together. A doubling of prices,
for example, threatens the structure of American society by imposing a dis-
proportionate burden on recipients of fixed incomes from salaries, wages,
insurance, annuities, savings accounts, pensions, trust funds and testamentary
136. See 88 Cong. Rec., Feb. 9, 1942, at 1174.
137. See 87 Cong. Rec., Dec. 19, 1941, at 10325.
13S.. See also 54 STAT. 1201, 18 U. S. C. §§ 14-17 (1940), requiring registration of
organizations subject to foreign control or affiliation and engaged in either revolutionary
or civilian military activity.
1. The Emergency Price Control Act of 1942, Pub. L. No. 421, 77th Cong., 2d
Sess. (hereinafter cited by section numbers only) became law on January 30, 1942.
Section l(a) contains a statement of the broad objectives of the Act phrased in
terms of preventing the social and economic effects of wartime inflation. While the
Act is also intended to restrict rent increases, rent control is not considered in this
Comment.
2. For example, control of installment buying. See Regulation W of the Board of
Governors of the Federal Reserve System (1941) 27 FF.D. RES. BULL 840, as amended,
id. at 974, 1088. Also the raising of reserve requirements by the Board of Governors
of the Federal Reserve System. See N. Y. Times, Oct. 26, 1941, § 3, p. 1, col. 5.
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dispositions.' Yet, certain groups are enriched through price increases,
profiteering, hoarding, manipulation and speculation. Concomitantly, the
morale of the nation is undermined with attendant social unrest and, often,
shifts in political power. Furthermore, if a high price level is reached, there
are strong reasons for anticipating deflation following the war, whereas if
prices are controlled the necessity for such a readjustment, always painful,
may in part be avoided. Moreover, high prices after the war may make the
postwar problem of trade and exchange adjustment even more acute than
otherwise. Still another objective for price control is to reduce the cost
of the war. It has been estimated that were it not for spiraling costs this
country might have spent about thirteen billions less on our last war expendi-
tures ;4 unless the prevailing rate of price advance is checked the cost of
our present victory program may be increased by at least fifty billions, or
about a third,0 a matter of moment in measuring the ultimate burden of
interest on the national debt.
The mechanics of the inflation process are readily understandable in terms
of the operation of prices and the effect of the war on them. In more or
less competitive markets price movements determine to a large extent the
kind and quantity of goods produced, by allocating factors of production to
manufacture of the relatively higher priced commodities. Likewise, when
there are unemployed resources, as in a depression, an increase in the quantity
of money distributed as income- resulting from the creation of new money
to pay for a soldier's bonus, for example, or a public works program or a
new industry-can force an increase of prices and profits, making new pro-
duction attractive and thus stimulating employment and increasing the quan-
tity of goods in the market. However, in periods of almost full employment
of resources, like the present, an increase in the quantity of money income
cannot evoke corresponding increased output.7 It can only have the effect of
3. See BRE.SCIANI-TURRONI, THE EcoNoMIcs OF INFLATION (1937) 404; HARDY,
WARTIME CONTROL OF PRICES (1940) 36-38; J. H. RoGERS, PROCESS OF INFLATION IN
FRANCE, 1914-1927 (1929) ; Hearings before House Committee on Banking and Currency
on H. R. 5479 (superseded by H. R. 5990), 77th Cong., 1st Sess. (1941) 146 (herein-
after cited as House Price Control Hearings); Speech by Mr. Leon Henderson, Price
Administrator, on Sept. 29, 1941, OPA Release No. PM-1267.
4. The estimate is by Mr. Bernard Baruch. N. Y. Times, Jan. 8, 1942, p. 17, col. 5.
5. Estimate made by Mr. Leon Henderson. N. Y. Times, Dec. 10, 1941, p. 28, col. 1.
6. The victory program at that time was estimated to require an expenditure of
about one hundred and fifty billion dollars. See N. Y. Times, Dec. 14, 1941, § 4, p. 7,
col. 3.
7. In fact, in numerous instances rapidly rising prices encourage speculation and
hoarding, thus operating to reduce instead of to increase supply. Moreover, it is not
possible to depend solely on higher prices as an incentive for an increase in supply
through capital expansion since often risks are so great that the government must
assume them. For a good discussion of why price breaks down as an efficient allocator,
see Henderson & Nelson, Prices, Profits and Government (1941) 19 HARv. Bus. REV.
389. See also HARDY, WARTIME CONTROL OF PIUCES (1940) 69; House Price Control
Hearings at 469. Yet as late as November, 1941, Walter D. Fuller, President of the
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bidding up prices as buyers compete for scarce goods.8 Under such pressure,
price rises, no longer operating to increase production, have the grave social
and economic consequences already mentioned. The society is suffering from
virulent inflation: its money income is increasing out of all relation to in-
creases in its real income, comprised of the total output of goods and services
available for consumption.
To control wartime inflation and prevent its social and economic conse-
quences price fixing alone is not enough, for the level of prices is but a
function of the amount of money income expended in the market and the
quantity of goods and services available for purchase with that money. In
addition, therefore, several other types of legal control are required, notably,
taxation, publicity, credit control and control over production. And proper cor-
relation of these controls requires comprehension of the paramount economic
problem presented by the war. War needs require a large sector of American
plant, manpower and productive capacity. To win the war that fraction of
economic potential must be so great as to impose absolute reductions on civilian
consumption. This is true even if capacity is increased by reemployment of the
unemployed, by employment of women, children and old people and by
lengthening working hours. At the same time these cuts in production for
civilian use are taking place, the Government is expanding purchasing power
by spending three to four billions a month for war; yet what is produced
for that money is not available for purchase by those whose incomes have
been expanded. In order to prevent dangerous price rises under these cir-
cumstances the money available to consumers for spending should be kept
down, more or less in proportion to the quantity of goods availahle for their
needs.' To accomplish this it is essential that both the demand and supply
sides of the market be manipulated.10
National Association of Manufacturers, said: "There is no better antidote for inflation
than the free working of the law of supply and demand." N. Y. Times, Nov. 19, 1941,
p. 35, col. 3.
S. The most complete and graphic presentation of recent price behavior is found
in Hearings before Senate Committee on Banking and Currency on H. R. 5990, 77th
Cong., 1st Sess. (1941) 17-71 (hereinafter cited as Senate Price (ontrol Hcarings).
- For a study of contrasts with World War I see radio speech by Mr. Leon Henderson,
as reported in N. Y. Times, Oct. 7, 1941, p. 25, col. 2. See also Nelson and Joy, Priecs
and the Wtar (1941) 52 MoNTHLY LABOR REVIEw 49; IMills, Prices and Cost of Lihing in
Two World Wars (1942) 19 Ac.'n. Par- ScL PRoc. 431. The fear, largely unwarranted,
of inflation which followed devaluation in 1934 is thrown into its true perspective by
comparison with the present threat. See ROGERS, CDp.rAsms IN Crsis (1938) c. 5.
9. See Rogers and Chandler, Inflation and Deflation (1932) 8 Ezcy. Soc. Sca-
EEcs 28; House Price Control Hearings at 36, 781; Henderson & Nelson, Prices, Profits
and Governnent (1941) 19 HAsv. Bus. REv. 389, 392. It is estimated that in 1942
people will have eighty billions to spend, but there vill be only si:xty-five billions in
goods to buy. See address by Mr. Galbraith of OPA, OPA Release No. T-24524,
Feb. 18, 1942.
10. Price Administrator Henderson has categorically denied that price fixing is
sufficient. See House Price Control Hcarings at 181, 469. The necessity for indirect
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On the demand side of the market upward pressure on prices can be re-
lieved both by reducing the'amount of purchasing power and by curbing
inflationary buying methods. To achieve the former result, several important
policies should be pursued simultaneously. Absolutely indispensable to an
effective plan of price control is a much more drastic tax policy than we have
yet developed." The necessary wartime complement to taxation, Government
borrowing, should be supported wherever feasible from current income in-
stead of from savings or bank credit if it is to be most effective as an income
absorbent.' 2 Furthermore, credit control must be re-designed to check spend-
ing without impeding the war or essential civilian purposes.Y' Capital flota-
tions must be scrutinized for their bearing on the war effort. Thrift, a curse
of depressions, should be revived as a virtue, and a sane wage policy is,
of course, a prerequisite to controlling inflation. 4 Finally, such inflationary
buying methods as installment purchasing'5 must be regulated, and in private
sales, speculation must be curbed where it is a recurrent factor in needlessly
raising prices. In addition to these controls over the demand side of the
market, the Government, since it is such a large buyer, can exercise a directly
depressive influence on prices by using a well-planned purchasing policy,
price controls is stressed in the following sources: HARDY, WARTIME CoNTRoL Or PtIlevS
(1940) ; S. E. HARRIS,'TE EcoNoMIcs OF AMERICAN DEFENSE (1941) ; HART & ALLEN,
PAYING FOit DEFENSE (1941); MENDERSHAUSEN, TnE EcoNoMIcs OF WAR (1940),
PIGou, Tui: POLITIcAL Ecoxomy OF WAR (2d ed. 1941); Grether and Davisson, Tax
Policy and Price Fixing as Economic Controls for Defense Mobilization (1941) 214
ANNALS Amt. ACAD. OF POL. AND SOC. SCI. 148; Williams, Economic and Financial
Aspects of the Defense Program (1941) 19 ACAD. OF POL. SCi. PROC. 301.
11. See HART & ALLEN, PAYING FOR DEFENSE (1941); PAUL, TnE EtmEcRGNcy JoB
OF FEDERAL TAXATION (1941) 27 Covet. L. Q. 3; Riches, Who Shall Pay for the War?
Ain Analysis of the Keyncs Plan (1941) STUDIES IN WAR ECONOICS BY I. L. 0.
(Studies and Reports, Series B, No. 33) 42; Comment (1942) 55 HARv. L. Rzv. 477.
12. See HARDY, op. cit. supra note 10, at 8. The movement of the price level and
the success of the war program are perhaps the primary standards by which to judge
both credit and fiscal policy rather than by focusing attention on the size of the govern-
ment debt or. 'the absolute amount of *credit outstanding. See HARDY, op. Cit. supra
note 10, at 42. 'Those who are *orried boer the increasing size of the government debt
wilt find .a brighter sidte in"BoRNS & WATSON,. GOVERNIMENT SPENDING (1940). The
notiii ,that futuie geerationS will be loaded with a heavy burden by present borrowing
is refuted "in- RoGES, CAPITALISM IN CRISIS (1938) 48.
13.: Diring the year ending in October, 1941, bank loans had increased by 501
or about,$3,000,000;000.'N.'Y. Times, Oct. 29, 1941, p. 1, col. 6; Eccles, Financial
Proble-rs-.of Dqensei (1941) 27 FED. REs. BULL 506. While price control, priorities,
increased'-reservd :requiremetts and the SEC are restraining influences in credit expan-
sion, -a 'more explicit ind coordinated policy might well be in order. The conflict
between the restriction of credit and the convenience of the Treasury should not block
a 'united -attempt to control credit extension.
14 See p'. 826'infra.
15. See Regulation W of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System
(1941) 27 FED. RES. BULL. 840, as amended, id. at 974, 1088. For imposition of more
drastic control over installment credit see N. Y. Times, Mar. 9, 1942, p. 1, col. 3.
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although it is doubtful whether the Administrator under the Act may resell
to reduce prices.'
6
On the supply side a variety of methods should be employed to increase
the quantity of goods available in the whole market. Absolute expansion of
productive facilities is one approach to the problem, and where necessary
it should be done at Government expense or under Government supervision.
Since, however, factors of production are limited and preference must be
given to war needs, conversion from normal to wartime production is essential
in many lines. Consequently to maximize over-all production, sub-contracting
must be fully utilized, and at the same time priorities must be employed to
minimize the tendency of the shift in production to drive up prices. Another
aid to enlarged supply involves training more skilled labor. 7 Nor should
the patent laws remain static since it has become painfully apparent that
patents have been persistently employed as devices to restrict production.18
In addition, encouragement of imports and relaxation of tariffs can free
domestic factors of production for other tasks at the same time that exports
are supervised to prevent outward flow of vital materials.10 Also important
is the serious reduction in immediate supply caused by hoarding and various
inventory practices. On the other hand, conservation and use of substitutes
have a beneficial effect on supply.
Important as are these varied techniques in cutting down imniney income
and enlarging real income, it is certain that, without more, prices cannot
be effectively controlled. For it is plain that the Government is not under-
taking anything like an adequate program on all crucial fronts. Something
is being done to cut down income, to enlarge the working force and to
increase output. But we have not achieved an adequate income tax rate.20
16. See p. 837 infra.
17. This might well be done as part of a coordinated government program to aid
labor in adjusting to war conditions.
18. Although the complete story of restriction of production by use of patents in
many important commodities has not been disclosed, anti-trust indictments to date
already indicate that the patent, which has been presumed to he a stimulus to techno-
logical development, has been converted into an instrument to restrain production. To
free war production, provision for compulsory licensing at a reasnnable price should be
made a part of the patent statute. See HAMILT N, TNEC REP., PATENrs AN Fora
ENTERPRiSEF Monograph 31 (1941).
19. See Har, op. cit. supra note 7, at 47-49. The Board of Economic Warfare
is now controlling the export of every article except goods expirted under Lend-Leae.
20. It is estimated that in 1942 people will have eighty billions to spend, but there
will be only sixty-five billions in goods to buy. OPA Release No. T-24524. Likewise,
economists of the Commerce Department estimate that national income in 1942 vill
increase eighteen and a half billions or about 19.6 per cent over 1941. They also predict
a rise in the general price level of twelve per cent. N. Y. Times, March 8, 1942, § 1,
p. 39, col. 4. Some of this excess income may be taken up with higher taxes. See the
tax measure proposed by Secretary of Treasury Morgenthau, N. Y. Times, March 4,
1942, p. 1, col. 1. However, the greater part of the increased income giving rise to
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We have not undertaken withholding taxes, nor forced savings. 21 Moreover,
we persist in financing our deficits by borrowing money in a way which
increases current income and does not cut it down.2 2 Much reliance must
therefore be put in direct price fixing under the Emergency Price Control
Act if prices are to be kept within manageable bounds. And the magnitude
of the job for price fixing and its enforcement is measured roughly by the
inadequacies of application of other controls2 3 and the resultant unbalance
of money income and physical output.
While the immediate objective in fixing prices is to aid in preventing the
social consequences of inflation, this policy must of course be subordinated to
the paramount goal of the war effort-maximization 24 of necessary production.
It is essential that industrial mobilization be given precedence, even at the
risk of more inflation. Ineffective as price may be in sonic situations of
inelastic supply, it still functions generally as a potent mobilizer of resources
into those uses where need is greatest. Thus, in the subordination of inflation
control to stimulation of war production, the price fixing authority should
danger of inflationary spending is in the hands of the lower and middle income groups.
It is unlikely that the major part of the increased income held by these groups will be
reached by any tax program presently contemplated. See Drucker, How to Pay for
the War (March, 1942) 184 HARPER's MAGAZINE 346. See generally, ANhwmsox, TNEC
REP., TAXATION, RECOVERY, AND DEFENSE, Monograph 20 (1940) 242 el seq,
21. The proposed tax measure suggested by Secretary of Treasury Morgenttatt
provides for a withholding tax of ten per cent. N. Y. Times, March 4, 1942, p. 1, col. 1.
More drastic is the proposal to collect two years' income tax in the current year, one
for 1941, the other for 1942; and thereafter to collect income taxes during the year il
which income was earned. See generally, HART & ALLEN, PAYING FOR DEI.-ENSE (1941).
Plans for forced savings on the part of the lower income groups are typified by the
suggestion of J. M. Keynes. KEYNES, How To PAY FOR THE WAR (1940). For a
criticism of such proposals, see Drucker, supra note 20, at 354; ANDERSON, Op. cit. supra
note 20, at 242, 249. Secretary of the Treasury Morgenthau has expressed his oppo-
sition for the present to forced savings plans. See N. Y. Times, March 7, 1942, p, 7,
col. 3.
22. Too small a percentage of the Government deficit is met with Defense Bonds
bought out of income and too large a percentage is financed by the creation of additional
bank credit. Other factors also make for an increase of effective money income. In a
time of boom all incomes circulate more rapidly than otherwise, especially under fear
of inflationary price rises. Furthermore, the usual responses of our elastic banking
system are now permitting an enormous expansion of business incomes, entirely apart
from the effects of Government financing. See Reid and Hatton, Price Control and
National Defense (1941) 36 ILL. L. REv. 255, 265 ct seq.; Comment (1942) 55 HARV.
L. REV. 429, 477 et seq.
23. See House Price Control Hearings at 200-01; Galbraith, The Selection (old
Timing of Inflation Controls (1941) 23 REv. EcoN. STAs'rTlcs 82.
24. Section 1(a). The particular words are: "to assist in securing adequate pro-
duction of commodities and facilities". What is adequate in a war economy may be
nothing short of the maximum. Also see PIGou, TiE POLITICAL EcoNoMY OF WAR
(2d ed. 1941) 128-33.
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perhaps have power to put a floor on prices as well as a ceilng.-5 No doubt
the argument for a higher price on the grounds of greater productivity is
subject to abuse, but its prime significance will make it a recurring issue.2 "
It should not be forgotten, however, that while maximization of war pro-
duction may conflict with price fixing, on the whole, the two are comple-
mentary.
OVER-ALL VERSUS SELECTIVE PRICE CONTROL
Once necessity for price fixing is agreed upon, and its task defined, atten-
tion focuses on methods to be employed. The Baruch plan, which Congress
rejected, called for ceilings on the price of labor as well as on farm and all
other products. Under this proposal, prices would be frozen as of a chosen
date; but they would be free to drop below that level and exceptions would
be made to permit increases necessary.2 7 The selective price control system
finally adopted not only excludes wages, and provides but very limited con-
trols for agricultural prices, but also grants to the Price Administrator dis-
cretion in selecting certain commodities for price ceilings. -5
Aside from the issue of wages and farm prices, in actual practice admin-
istration under either plan might well produce similar results. With almost
unlimited power to pick and choose commodities under the selective system.
it is possible for the price administrator to act quickly on a wide front
without waiting to evaluate closely a particular market. Graphically illus-
trating this flexibility is the issuance of a price schedule which purports to
25. In effect the Price Administrator can set actual prices or minimum prices
through the use of his power to buy and sell. The agricultural provisions of the Act
do not automatically set minimum prices for farm products.
26. Mr. Bernard Baruch, in referring to his experience in the last war, remarked:
"'We never found a reduction of prices ever brought a lowered production of goods
." See House Price Control Hearings at 232.
27. For a concise statement of the over-all plan which has been popularized in
this country by Mr. Bernard Baruch, see Baruch, Priorities, the Snchronkzing Force
(1941) 19 HAv. Bus. REv. 261; testimony of Mr. Baruch in House Price Control
Hearings at 989-1045. The Baruch plan was substantially incorporated inti the bill
introduced by Representative Gore on Oct. 6, 1941, H. R. 5760. The over-all plan has
been used abroad, particularly in Germany, which has had the longest experience with
price control among countries with highly developed economies; see Domneratzgky, Price
Control in Germany-Policy and Technique (1941) 1 INTm. REP. Sunv. No. 19 at 1;
REvEILLE, THE Spon. OF EUROPE (1941) 215-20.
28. Sections 2(a), 302(c). Arguments in favor of over-all price control usually
start with the premise that since all prices constitute a more or less interrelated seamless
web, fi-ng of only some prices will not stop inflation. For it is contended that the
moment one price is fixed it is almost immediately out of date since all its components
are rising at the same time. From the contrary point of view, support for selective
action hinges primarily on directing attention to disadvantages of an all-inclusive ceiling.
First, it is urged that a blanket ceiling on all prices is inequitable since different
industries may be at different stages in price inflation. In addition, to the extent that
variations are allowed in the blanket ceiling the administrative problem of handling
countless complaints is claimed to be too large and unwieldly.
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cover approximately 1,800 different fats and oils.20 The statement of con-
siderations prompting broad action can be generally stated, and the burden
of adducing evidence then shifts to the one who objects to the price, a pro-
cedure parallelling the attempt to vary a price set under a general price-
stop order.
In lengthy debates over the alternatives, the role of wages and agricultural
prices were major points of controversy. It is evident that stabilization of
wage costs is essential to general price stability, although political considera-
tions have here worked against economic realities. It is also apparent that
partly checked farm prices will continue to exert an upward pressure on
wages by increasing the cost of living, in spite of measures undertaken by
OPA in other fields. Although this lack of effective control over agricultural
prices30 or wages handicaps any attempt to combat inflation by price fixing,
it is true that freezing all wages would probably stifle the flow of workers
into war production, in the absence of a power to conscript and mobilize
workers for industry and a technique for transferring them.Y Now that
war has pushed some political considerations into the background, price
spiraling through wage increases may be dealt with more realistically. OPA,
however, is hardly the mechanism to use since factors considered in fixing
wages are not necessarily the same as those involved in establishing com-
modity prices.
32
STRUCTURE AND POWERS OF PRE-STATUTORY PRICE FIXINU
Prior to passage of the EPCA the President by executive order established
administrative machinery directly to control prices.33 The order bestowed
29. OPA Price Schedule No. 53, Fats and Oils, 3 C. C. H. 1941 War Serv. g 43,253.
30. The present power over agricultural prices is dealt with on p. 839.
31. So far our most efficient means of effecting a transfer of workers has been
the high wages prevailing in defense industries. While labor has voluntarily agreed
to refrain from stopping production, and machinery has been set up to resolve disputes,
it is disappointing to find that no provision has been made thus far to stabilize wages.
We can no longer, dodge issues which are "too hot" to handle. See Schlecter, Needed
Immediately (1941) 30 SuRvEY GRAPnic 632. The Gallup poll showed that 67% of
the people approve of wage as well as price control modeled after Canada's price control
law. N. Y. Times, Nov. 9, 1941, p. 42, col. 2.
32. Price Administrator Henderson has maintained that price inflation cannot be
curbed if wages or any other cost is allowed constantly to rise. Housc Price Control
Hearings at 143. Opposition by OPA to wage control was ostensibly based on the
conviction that rising wages had not been a dominant pressure on established price
ceilings, that wages were trailing living costs, that the staff of OPA was not qualified
to handle the specialized problems of wage negotiation and that fixing prices would
be a powerful deterrent to wage increases. See N. Y. Times, Dec. 4, 1941, p. 39, col. 2;
testimony of Mr. Lubin in House Price Control Hearings at 1840.
33. Executive Order No. 8734, 3 C. C. H. 1941 War. Serv. 43,151. For contrast
with price control in the last war see Stewart, Government Price Control in the First
World War (1941) 52 MONTHLY LABOR REvIEW 271; Reid and Hatton, Price Control
and National Defense (1941) 36 ILL. L. REv. 255, 259.
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a broad grant of power on an Administrator with directions to prevent price
increases by publishing and enforcing maximum prices, commissions, margins,
fees and charges. Aside from a statement of purposes, the only standard
specified was that the prices be deemed "fair and reasonable" by the Price
Administrator. Sanctions in the order included the stigma of publicity and
the threat of the President's power of requisitioning and commandeering
given him under existing statutes.34
OPA, acting under the Presidential order, first applied maximum schedules
to volatile, basic raw materials of our economy. Commodities thus affected
were usually characterized by rising prices stemming from actual shortage,
heavy forward buying, hoarding, increased costs and profiteering?"5 The
only sanction exercised to date has been that of publicity, and even there the
use has been relatively slight ;30 but these other sanctions may still be avail-
able for use now that the Act is passed if it be reasoned that the statutory
grant supplements, but does not entirely displace, the executive order.
34. The statutes providing for exercise of these various powers are specifically
enumerated in the Executive Order No. 8734, 3 C. C. H. 1941 War Serv. '43,151; see
Comment (1942) 55 HARv. L. RE%. 477, 4.83. The Price Administrator may recommend
to the President commandeering of plants in cases where there is a refusal to fill a gov-
ernment defense order, or a refusal to give the government a preference at a reasonable
price. He may also recommend to the President requisitioning of materials denied ex-
port. In addition, he can suggest that the Chief Executive invoke the emergency puwer
over transportation and thereby effect a priority in shipment of materials. Further, there
is the power under three statutes to accumulate or dispose of reserve stocks of strategic
and critical materials.
Authority for the President's action, in addition to his power under these statutes,
was derived directly from war powers implied to the President in the Constitution. See
SEN. Doc. No. 133, 76th Cong., 2d Sess. (1939); House Price Control Hcarings at 373.
In addition, absence of specific statutory authority for much of the price fixing dne in
the last war is a significant precedent. But cf. Standard Chemical & Metals Corp. v.
WVaugh Chemical Corp., 231 N. Y. 51, 131 N. E. 566 (1921).
35. This is the order of frequency of factors causing price rises as revealed by a
study made by OPA for the first 33 commodities on which formal ceilings were set.
In some cases, several factors operated together. See House Price Control Hearings
at 284. To focus only on the formal schedules, however, is to ignore equally significant
voluntary agreements. Combination of formal and informal price fixing is estimated to
affect more than 3011 of the principal raw materials and primary manufactured gnows.
Speech by Mr. Leon Henderson, N. Y. Times, Oct. 7, 1941, p. 25, cul. 2. Also !,ee House
Price Control Hearings at 58.
36. In only a few instances have the names of the violators been publicized. Sic
N. Y. Times, Nov. 20, 1941, p. 45, col. 1.
Oddly enough the validity of price schedules was raised in connection with the liqui-
dation of debtors' estates. In at least one case the court ordered a sale in equity to be
conducted in conformity with the OPA price schedules. The Pennsylvania Co. for Ins.
v. Cincinnati & L. E. R. R., U. S. Dist Ct., S. D. Ohio, Sept. 19, 1941; cf. Oliver Clyde
Riggs, U. S. Dist. Ct., E. D. Pa. Oct. 28, 1941. Here all articles sold above the fixed
price were subject to confirmation of the court. In a bankruptcy proceeding, such as In re
Bender Body Co., 10 U. S. L. NVEE 2424 (N. D. Ohio 1942), the court could reason-
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CONSTITUTIONALITY OF STATUTORY PRICE CONTROL
Three possible sources of constitutional power can be relied upon to
authorize wartime price control legislation: the war power, 37 the fiscal and
currency power, 38 and the commerce power.39 The first of these is the most
obvious choice.40 Contemporary history makes it bluntly plain that modern
war means total war, and the critical effect of prices on domestic morale as
well as on production has compelled every great nation at war to exercise
control over its price structure. 41 Aware of this necessity, the Supreme Court
directly as well as by dictum sustained statutory price fixing in the fields of
food and fuel during the last war, and there is little doubt that the more
comprehensive legislation of the present war would be equally valid.
42
The fact, however, that the Act is probably not constitutionally vulnerable
because of its purpose or scope does not automatically make it immune from
unconstitutionality in regard to its execution or its separate parts. 43 Consti-
tutional restraints on arbitrary action are still operative, but the necessity
for an expansion of the scope of Congressional and executive action means
a lessened compass for such restrictions. This narrowed concept of consti-
tutional limitation provides the criterion for testing subsequently the con-
stitutionality of different sections of the Act against the function and economic
context of the particular provision.
ably take the position that equity will enforce the schedules to effectuate the public
interest during the emergency without passing on the constitutionality of the authority.
In support of the power of equity to consider the public interest see SEC v. United
States Realty and Imp. Co., 310 U. S. 434 (1940).
37. See Highland v. Russell Car and Snow Plow Co., 279 U. S. 253 (1929); United
States v. Macintosh, 283 U. S. 605 (1931) ; cf. Block v. Hirsh, 256 U. S. 135 (1921);
Memorandum by OPA in House Price Control Hearings at 63; Senate Price Control
Hearings at 218; Ginsburg, Legal Aspects of Price Control in the Defense Programn
(1941) 27 A. B. A. J. 527; Hannah, Sonie Legal Aspects of Price Control in Wartime
(1941) 27 CORN. L. Q. 21.
38. Prevention of inflation is an attempt to regulate the value of the national cur-
rency. Norman v. Baltimore & Ohio R. R., 294 U. S. 240 (1935); Juilliard v. Green-
man,, 110 U. S. 421 (1884); Veazic Bank v. Fenno, 8 Wall. 533 (U. S. 1869).
39. See United States v. Darby Lumber Co., 312 U. S. 100 (1941); Sunshine
Anth. Coal Co. v. Adkins, 310 U. S. 381, 396 (1940); United States v. Rock Royal
Coop., Inc., 307 U. S. 533 (1939). Although Congressional power over commerce has
been greatly extended in recent years, it is doubtful if intrastate prices could be con-
trolled sofely under the interstate commerce clause.
40. See Charles Evans Hughes, The Fighting Powers of the United States Under
the Constitution, 55 CONG. REc. (1917) pt. 8, app. ix, 551, 553; United States v. Mpe-
intosh, 283 U. S. 605, 622 (1931).
41. For a survey of foreign price control experience see Memorandum in House Price
Control Hearings at 88.
42. See note 37 supra.
43. See Hamilton v. Kentucky Distilleries & Warehouse Co., 251 U. S. 146, 156
(1919).
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PRICE FIxING UNDER THE Acr
The problem of price fixing varies strikingly with the type of market in
which prices are to be set. If the administrators are attempting to fix prices
in competitive markets, their work will be almost impossible if the present
pressure of expanding money income on a fixed or declining supply of goods
remains effective. Insofar as priority control or direct allocations are used
in significant areas of the economy, however, the job of price control becomes
less difficult, and less important. The price term of a bargain settled by a
priority or allocations order is a matter of bookkeeping and not (f crucial
importance in determining the allocation of resources and the distribution
of income.
Before searching for norms of price fixing, it is well to suggest the varying
approaches possible in price regulation. For while most emphasis to date
has been placed on setting maximum prices through issuance of schedules,
this is only one method. In some instances, the government may deem it
necessary to stimulate supply by setting a minimum or actual, instead of
a maximum, price. To achieve this, the provision in the Act giving the
Government power to buy and sell commodities4 4 may be employed to good
advantage. Then, too, it is quite likely that in some fields of price control,
particularly on the retail level, margins instead of definite prices will be used.
These margins may specify either a fixed sum to be added to the unit cost
or a percentage addition correlated with cost, sales or investment. In addi-
tion, in setting a margin or price limit, the price authority may prefer to
freeze the margin or price as of a prior date, saving time and initiative neces-
sary to establish a sequence of new price relationships.4a
Usually, however, fixing prices will involve reference to more or less
well defined standards. And it is essential that these standards be established
and applied as part of a unified price fixing policy. Lack of such a policy
was a major defect of the World War price control program. In the main,
price fixing then was a "trading proposition". After price control became
more firmly established it was desired to replace the higgling process by
"scientific principles", but these never materialized.4  Similarly in England
during the last war, food pricing proceeded by way of "costings, conference,
and compromise". 47 Thus use of definite standards is vitally important in
the mechanics of price fixing, and it is around these norms, particularly over
44. Section 2(c). See discussion of high cost marginal pruducers infra at pp. 836-37.
45. An example is OPA Price Schedule No. 67, New Machine Tools, 3 C. C. H. 1942
War Serv. f 43,267.
46. See Haney, Price Fixing in the U. S. During the War (1919) 34 Pta.. SLI. Q.
104, 262, 434 at 446; STri, GOVERNMENT PRIMc POLICY TIN THE U. S. DML'tING TIME
WoaD WAR (1939) 97.
47. Baster, Control of Food Prices (1941) STUDIE-S IN WAR EcoNoMtcs BY I. L. 0.
(Studies and Reports, Series B, No. 33) 105; cf. Taggart, The Cost Principle in Mini-
num Price Regulation (1938) 8 MICH. Bus. SrtVms No. 3 at 221.
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the role of costs and profits, that most of the controversy will rage. However,
the infinite variety of the American economy will defy rigid adherence to
any set of a priori principles or advance promulgations.
4
In the Act,40 two fairly broad norms are first laid down: one that the
ceiling be generally fair and equitable, and two, that the price order effectuate
the purposes of the Act." Then, so far as practicable, the Administrator
shall give due consideration to the prices of the commodity prevailing between
October 1 and October 15, 1941. Without purporting to be all inclusive the
bill suggests, as other relevant factors, speculative fluctuations, costs of pro-
duction and transportation and profits. 1 Each ceiling must be accompanied
by a statement of considerations which were involved in its issuance.5
2
Reference to the purposes of the Act is also made in setting up still other
standards. The Administrator is explicity granted authority to issue ceilings
with such classifications and differentiations and to provide for such adjust-
ments and exceptions as are necessary or proper to carry out the purposes
of the Act.53 In addition, as was true in the last war and under the NRA,
effective price control entails control over trade practices, and the bill pro-
vides that speculative or manipulative practices, and selling, marketing or
inventory practices are subject to regulation where they are inconsistent with
the purposes of the Act. Changes in form or quality of the product and
hoarding are specific examples singled out for special mention. 4
I Thus it is apparent that the purposes of the Act will be of significance in
determining in the courts the: validity of any particular action taken by the
Administrator. The conflict between the objectives of peak output and pre-
vention of price increases results in an apparent inconsistency in the purposes
of the Act, and may subject it to attack as not meeting the constitutional
test of definiteness.
48. One of the characteristics of the relatively successful German price control expe-
rience has been its chameleonlike flexibility. See Domeratzsky, Price Control in Germany
(1941) 1 INTER. REF. SERVICE: No. 19 at 1; SwEEzy, Thi STRucuoE or NAZI EcON-
omY (1941).
49. Section 2(a). Contrast peacetime standards in WALLACE AND OTlIElts, "rNEC
REP., EcoNOmic STANDARDS OF GOVERNMENT PRICE CONTROL, Monograph 32 (1941)
475-78; for a competent discussion of the possible effects of price reductions see id. at
494-95.
50. See pp. 1-2 supra for discussion of purposes.
51. Section 2(a). Note the important temporal limitation on profit increases or
decreases which the Administrator may consider in fixing prices. This was lacking in
the original bill.
52. Ibid.
53. Section 2(c). If "adjustments" be construed in its broad sense to mean changes
in a schedule upon reconsideration of the data of the industry, this provision could
conceivably be used to modifybsignificantly a previously existing schedule without having
to abide by the criteria in § 2(a) except the one referring to the purposes of the Act.
. 54. Section 2(d).
[Vol. 51: 819830
ASPECTS OF WARTIME PRICE CONTROL
The purposes, however, are capable of partial reconciliation since, although
higher prices usually stimulate greater production, a point is reached in war-
time where, with all factors of production employed, higher prices will not
elicit greater output. With this in view, it is probably true that the standards
set forth are definite enough for constitutional requirements. '  The fact that
the Administrator has practically unlimited discretion in weighing various
factors is not a constitutional defect5(
While the Act provides a frame of reference for price policy, it is essen-
tially a skeleton which has to be filled in. Fortunately, we have not only the
experience of World War I on which to draw for comparison, but a con-
siderable corpus of opinion and experience which has already accumulated
in this country since the outbreak of the present conflict. Thus, it seems
special attention will be paid to the maintenance of a price which will act
as a stream along which commerce flows.5 T Enormously detailed cost analysis
has been repudiated as a basis for price,58 but if cost changes are great
enough a revision in the ceiling will be made. 9 So far, in setting prices,
rather heavy reliance has been placed on past or prevailing prices. Further-
more, it appears that how much profit will be considered reasonable, and how
far back in time the analysis will go, will vary with the particular industry.
Highly significant as a statement of future policy is the "hands off" rule
which Mr. Henderson has declared and followed regarding industrial trade
practice and which is now incorporated into the Act. 0 Without giving legal
approval to such practices as the basing point system, the various schedules
are framed on the assumption that these prior trade customs will continue.
Hence, instead of altering or reforming industrial mores, successful enforce-
ment of price ceilings is sought through freezing previous trade practice. Of
course, where the manner of sale patently conflicts with the effort to suppress
price advances, changes can be expected.
To what extent there will be adherence to these basic tenets of price
control in the future is problematical. Prior to our entrance into the war,
business palatability and administrative convenience were of major importance
in framing price schedules. In addition, internal studies by OPA reveal a
55. See Sunshine Anth. Coal Co. v. Adkins, 310 U. S. 381 (1940); United States v.
Rock Royal Coop., Inc., 307 U. S. 533 (1939). Contrast United States v. Cohen Grojc.
Co., 255 U. S. 81 (1921). In addition, it may be argued that all of the stated purposes,
were not meant to apply to each of the functions of the Price Administrator -for in-
stance, that the purpose of maximization of production applies only to use of the buy
and sell power.
56. See Opp Cotton Mills v. Administrator, 312 U. S. 1211 (1Q41) ; Hampton, Jr. &
Co. v. United States, 276 U. S. 394 (1928).
57. See House Price Control Hearinqs at 4 87.
58. Id. at 440.
59. Id. at 461, 487.
60. Section 2(h) ; see House Price Control Hcarinls at 439-40.
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rather easy acceptance of prevailing price as a controlling norm. 0' Now,
however, that war has solidified public opinion, perhaps less emphasis Will
be placed on profit and more on patriotism.
Cost. Although cost analysis was given a somewhat subordinate position
by Mr. Hendei-son in the legislative hearings, it is probably inevitable that
as price control matures cost will be increasingly used as a norm for price
setting. In the early stages of price-fixing, especially when the price authority
feels insecure, not too much attention is paid to cost. But as pressure on
prices continues and requests for revision grow more numerous, cost analysis
will often be decisive. Admittedly, to predicate prices on cost has numerous
drawbacks which should be mentioned by way of caveat. Yet for all their
shortcomings, accounting and cost techniques will be used by both Govern-
ment and business.
As a matter of fact, cost data even at this late date is sometimes lacking.
In such instances, chief reliance can probably be placed on restricting total
profits to a fixed ratio of total investment. Even assuming existence of cost
information, we cannot infer that accounting is uniform despite stimulated
development of trade associations during the last war and during the NRA.
0 2
With cost determination largely a matter of arbitrary choices or business
convenience it is not surprising to find accountancy characterized as an art-
science,63 *or worse. The sheer variety and complexity of industry defies
adherence to fixed rules which are uniformly applicable.
In some instances utility of accounting analysis is severely limited or
irrelevant largely because price of one commodity is not independent of the
price of others. 4 Determination of cost for one of two commodities, both
the result of a single process, is apt to be arbitrary within a wide range.
Instead of dealing only with a single joint-cost commodity in fixing prices,
it may be necessary to set prices for all products of the joint process. There
are many other examples of the interrelation of commodities which upset
simple price-cost relations. For instance, where two commodities both use
the same raw material and the aim is to favor one of the two for military
61. Memorandum in House Price Control Hearings at 277, 280. The fact that a price
advance has occurred does not necessarily mean that the new price represents "economic
value on the market" and is therefore justified.
62. PEARCE, TNEC REP., TRADE ASSOCIATION SURVEY, Monograph 18 (1941) 258-
81, 292.
63. MACic, THE FLOW OF BUSINESS FUNDS AND CONSUMER PURCIHASING POWER
(1941) 215-16, 213. "As the apostle would put it, accountancy is all things to all mten.
It is at once a picture, a scheme of notation, a language, a technique, a ritual, an instru-
ment, and a social institution." Hamilton, Cost as a Standard for Price (1937) 4 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROB. 321, 323; HAMILTON, PRICE AND PRICE POLICIES (1938) passimn; see
Taggart, The Cost Principle in Minimum Price Regulation (1938) 8 MiH. Bus. STUDIES
No. 3 at 173, 269; Taggart, Minilnumn Prices under the NRA (1936) 7 MICH. Bus.
STUDIEs No. 3 at 385 (Bibliography, pp. 462-73).
64. MILLS, THE BEHAVIOR OF PRICES (1927) 140-51, 213.
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reasons, the price authority should raise the price on this one in order to
give it the greater command over the common material. Existence of sub-
stitute products also plays havoc with cost figures as a basis for pricing.63
Other problems arise out of the fact that some cost increases may not
justify price rises. Thus, an increase in wages may be offset by greater pro-
ductivity per unit of output, leaving unchanged the prime factor - cot per
unit of output. In addition, it generally would be unwise to raise prices to)
prepare for a cost increase which has not materialized; for example, this
would result in an invitation to labor to ask for more wages and accelerate
the cost-price spiral. Relatedly, selling and administrative costs increases
should not be accepted without verification by concrete evidence, as in many
cases such costs will remain constant or will decrease per unit now that war
has made high pressure salesmanship largely an anachronism. Although
it is contrary to the major orientation of a war economy, advertisers have
been assured that their domain will be respected by allowing companies a
deduction for advertising as a legitimate expense.O Perhaps clearer is the
status of corporate income and excess profits taxes which are not a cost
of production and should not be recognized as such for price purposes.
How long a firm will be expected to absorb increased costs will probaly
depend in part on the relation of price and costs at the time of the original
price stabilization. 7 Most likely, to avoid furthering the spiral of cost and
price, OPA will stave off price advances as long as possible; and then a new
schedule applying to all in the industry can be issued with the provision
that any firm may seek specific relief from undue hardship. But the question
of the issuance of new ceilings must be viewed in the over-all perspective.
Thus, if production of a firn is restricted because of priorities and if cost
per unit advances, 8 pressure will be brought to bear to raise the price ceiling.
But when it is realized that one of the purposes of priorities and allocations
is to force a switch into war production, it becomes evident that price policy
65. For discussion of these problems see Baster, Control of Food Priecs in L L. 0.,
ST-DIES IN WR EcoxomIcs ny I. L. 0. (Studies and Reports, Series B, N,,. 33) 100;
Haney, Price Fixing in th U. S. During the War (1919) 34 Pot. Sc. Q. 104, 262, 434
at 274. Another knotty problem concerns cost analysis for goods made tu specifications.
See OPA Price Schedule No. 67, New Machine Tools, 3 C. C. H. 1942 War Serv.
43,267.
66. See report of Speech by Mr. Leon Henderson to advertisers. N. Y. Times, Nov.
14, 1941, p. 35, col. 1. Reasons for advertising although oversold are listed in N. Y.
Times, Nov. 19, 1941, p. 34, col. 1.
67. Clearly one of the most important statements of OPA price policy to date is
an address by Mr. Joel Dean, OPA Price Executive, December 3, 1941, OPA Release
No. PM-1683.
68. It would seem that the only justifiable ground for a request by a company that
its ceiling be raised is that its variable or out-of-pocket costs have increased; increase
in overhead cost per unit as production drops would seemingly not offer justification for
a raise in the ceiling as long as the Government is nkst insuring that all firms make a
profit during the war.
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should not thwart this aim by making it profitable to continue in the same
non-military pursuit. So in the absence of other considerations, price policy
should not be used as a life-saver to rescue firms which might better be
shut down or forced into war production.
Profits. Use of profits as a price fixing norm may render complex cost
analysis superfluous as, for instance, where profit figures demonstrate on
their face that the corporation or industry is prosperous. 0 Involved, how-
ever, in the use of profits as a criterion are many serious problems: what,
for example, constitutes a reasonable profit or what is the proper Govern-
ment attitude toward depressed industries?7° Thus, some may urge a duty
on the part of the Government to insure industry against loss. In addition,
use of the norm of profits is complicated by the fact that profit analysis
involves three separate units: the particular industry,71 a single company in
that industry, and a product of that company. Frequently, no doubt, adjust-
ment of a price schedule will be urged by a single firm in relation to only one of
its manyOproducts. Under such circumstances there is great temptation for
the reviewing body to concentrate solely on the cost, price, and profit position
of the single commodity. This may lead to pitfalls since determining cost
allocation for a single article in a multi-product process involves use of arbi-
trary accounting procedures. The administrative burden in determining
profit for a single product, moreover, would be unduly severe. To the extent
that profits are used as a criterion for price increases, it is preferable to
examine the over-all profits of the corporate entity rather than the profit
margins of individual products in the multiple-product firm. And perhaps
even more important than corporate profit position is the profit status of
the industry as a whole.
Insofar as a working general principle regarding profits can be laid down,
price advances should not be granted for particular items unless out-of-pocket
costs exceed existing prices and unless the industry as a whole cannot operate
profitably. Although litigation may be instituted by a single firm, the court
rather than stressing a particular corporation's profit should emphasize the
profit position of the whole industry to which the price schedule was directed.
Since the statute only requires the schedule to be "generally fair and equit-
69. This raises the question of the accuracy and uniformity of corporate figures on
income. Profits are sometimes concealed through accounting devices, including secret
reserves and unwarranted depreciation deductions. Delicately fine lines concerning profits,
however, probably need not be drawn since price fixingis not an anti-profiteering statute
so much as it is anti-inflationary. House Price Control Hearings at 455. Cf. Picot,
THE PoLTIcAL EcoNo.Y OF WAR (2d ed. 1941) 112-15.
70. Admittedly present conditions make an elastic demand unlikely, but it must not
be forgotten that lower prices may yield greater profits under certain circumstaneces.
71. While the definition of an industry is presumed, in many instances marking the
boundary lines will be an extremely difficult task.
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able", probably a minority of firms may suffer losses without tile order being
held invalid for arbitrariness.72
Naturally any generalization in this field is subject to numerous excep-
tions. Thus, reliance on covering out-of-pocket costs as part of the test
must be modified where there is possibility of shifting from one product
to another within the firm's line. Moreover, if the firm or industry makes
a practice of basing price on marginal cost, the cost of transporting the final
twenty per cent of the product to market may be so much higher than the
cost for the balance that average cost may be a superior and less inflationary
basis of price than marginal cost.73 Similarly, within an industry as, a whole
there is the question of the method for determining what constitutes a
reasonable rate of profit. The answer is most easily obtained by reference
for a base period to the average rate of return on investment in the industry
before taxes are deducted.74 Perhaps the base period should be varied from
industry to industry in an effort to obtain a typical period. The statute
unfortunately seeks to restrict profit and cost analysis to the period during
and subsequent to the year ending October 1, 194 1,-15 but it is plain that
this is an inflationary restriction and that an intelligent judgment will often
require consideration of a longer span of time.
A number of constitutional issues are raised by a scheme of setting price'
for a single firm in terms of a standard based on profits for the industry.
It is difficult to generalize in the absence of cases; the facts themselves will
aid tremendously in resolving questions of arbitrariness. A priori, however,
it is probably true that the fixing of a price which prevents an adequate
profit to an individual firm is not a violation of the Fifth Amendment. For
fixing maximum prices for an industry probably falls on the constitutional
72. Practically all price schedules issued before the Act became effective provided
for modification for hardship and inequity. This was designed to permit individual
relief in extreme cases. The power to make exceptions under §2(c) is authority for
the continuation of this practice even though the Act is not explicit about procedure
for this type of matter. Under more recent ceilings, petition for amendment is the
mode of relief. See OPA Temporary .Maximum Price Regulation Xo. 6. Canned Fruit,
and Vegetables, 3 C. C. H. 1942 War Serv. V[ 45,006, and OPA Procedural Regulation
No. 1, 3 C. C. H. 1942 War Serv. g 41,101.
73. Suppose that 805 of Grade X fuel oil is moved by tankers owned by the
big oil companies from the Gulf to New York at a cost of 21 cents per barrel. The
remaining 20%, however, must be shipped in chartered tankers at a rate set at 57 cents
per barrel by the Maritime Commission. Even if the Maritime Commission cannot be
induced to lower rates, it does not follow that the big oil companies which ship all of
the oil should be allowed a price for the total shipments based on the cost of shipping
the last 20%. Average cost would seem a much more reasonable standard. Moreover,
since Grade X fuel oil is only one member of the petroleum joint products family, it
may be preferable to consider over-all costs and profits of the industry rather than
treat each component separately. Of course, a government subsidy for the final 20%
is another alternative.
74. Simply because an industry has been enjoying a high rate of profits over the
recent years does not necessarily entitle it to continue to earn the same return.
75. Section 2(a).
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side of the line between a "regulation" and a "taking of property without
just compensation". 76 In fact, the Fifth Amendment does not prohibit laws
that indirectly result in harm or loss to individuals.7 Therefore where a
general regulation is directed to a legitimate end, it is not invalid because
it may cause hardship in a particular case.78 The statute, moreover, does not
compel a producer to sellJ0 In recent cases involving fixing prices for an
industry or a particular sector of an industry, the Supreme Court has ap-
proved reasonable administrative orders even though it recognized that fatal
injury to some producers would follow.80 To argue, furthermore, that every
business corporation should enjoy the legal status of a public utility and thus
be allowed a fair rate of return on its fair value would be to apply an un-
fortunate and confused body of legal opinions on valuation built around
unique conditions of utility operation.
High cost marghal producers. How frequently the complaint of inadequate
profits will occur depends in large part on what norms are used in treatment
of high cost or marginal producers. During the last war, the general policy
of the price authority was to establish only one maximum price; that single
price was set high enough to encourage employment of the bulk, if not all,
of available productive capacity. Today this bulk-line principle is in disrepute
on the grounds that the single price has to be so high that inflation cannot
be effectively controlled.8 1 In this war, by words,s - by statute"a and by ad-
ministrative action8 4 the price authority is committed to a two-price system,
76. For contrast between "regulation" and "taking" see Morrisdale Coal Co. v.
United States, 259 U. S. 188 (1922); Pine Hill Coal Co. v. United States, 259 U. S.
191, 196 (1922); Highland v. Russell Car and Snow Plow Co., 279 U. S, 253 (1929);
Hamilton v. Kentucky Distill. Co., 251 U. S. 146 (1919) ; Du Pont de Neinours & Co.
v. Hughes, 50 F. (2d) 821 (C. C. A. 3rd, 1931).
77. Knox v. Lee, 12 Wall. 457 (U. S. 1870).
78. See New York Rapid Transit Corp. v. City of New York, 303 U. S. 573 (1938)
United States v. Hudson, 299 U. S. 498 (1937); Bayside Fish Co. v. Gentry, 297 U. S.
422, 427 (1936) ; Fox v. Standard Oil Co., 294 U. S. 87 (1935) ; Pierce Oil Co. V. City
of Hope, 248 U. S. 498 (1919); Purity Extract Co. v. Lynch, 226 U. S. 192 (1912).
79. Section 4(d).
80. Morgan v. United States, 304 U. S. 1, 20 (1938); Tagg Bros. & Moorhead v.
United States, 280 U. S. 420 (1930) ; cf. Acker v. United States, 298 U. S. 426 (1936).
81. See House Price Control Hearings at 104-06; HARDY, WARTimE CoNToRL oF
PRI ES (1940) 141.
82. House Price Control Hearings at 441.
83. Section 2(e). Section 2(a) (7) in the original administration bill combined
the idea of maximum production with the prevention of large profits to low cost pro-
ducers. The change in the two drafts may not make a material difference since § 2(e)
is obviously designed to serve this function.
84. Among other similar actions, the Metals Reserve Co. is specifically exempted
from adherence to the price schedules of some metals in order to facilitate government
buying at a higher price from a marginal producer. See OPA Price Schedule No, 15,
Copper, 3 C. C. H. 1941 War Serv. 1f 43,215. Provision has been made for the Govern-
ment to pay a higher price for the opening of additional mines and for added output
from mines now operating.
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By fixing a higher price for the essential marginal operator his profitable
production is assured, and the low or average cost producers can make a
substantial profit at the lower price.
But the differential price system will not be used in every industry where
there is a variety of cost conditions. Where a few isolated producers have
abnormal cost situations, OPA may negotiate with them individually and
grant specific relief.8 5 In other industries, the spread in costs may not lie
great enough to warrant undertaking tile administrative difficulties invtdlvel
in sifting and sorting the different components of the industry. Then, too,
there is the danger that with too frequent use, the two-price system may
degenerate into cost-plus pricing with its loss of incentive for efficient pro-
duction and other accompanying abuses.
A major problem attending use of a two-price system concerns disposition
of the higher price product. Even if private buyers are willing to pay the
higher price because an urgent need for the product makes price a secondary
consideration, this results in unequal cost conditions among buyers and leads
to pressure for higher prices at subsequent stages of manufacture and dis-
tribution. There are, however, other alternatives. Thus, the Government's
power to buy and sell commodities can be important in effecting a two-price
system s6 despite the fact that authority for exercise of the power is divided
and that it cannot be used to lower prices by dumping goods on the market.
For the Government could absorb tile loss by buying the output of the high
cost producers and reselling it at the lower of the two fixed prices.87 In
addition, the Government might sidestep handling of the product and simply
have high cost producers sell at the regular price with the Government pay-
ing the difference in the two prices as a subsidy to these producers. Such
a bonus or subsidy system may be feasible where dollar values are not too
great. However, where huge sums are at stake, the Government may prefer
to buy the entire output at different prices and distribute it at one price
which is less than higher cost producers demand yet sufficient to cover total
expenditure by the Government trading corporation.88 It is apparent from
these alternatives that, for effective treatment of marginal producers through
a dual price policy, the buy and sell power provided for in the price legis-
lation is of major significance.80
85. See House Price Control Hearings at 441. Also see grant of specific relief ti
Phoenix Iron Co., OPA Price Schedule No. 6, Iron and Steel, 3 C. C. H. 1941 War
Serv. f143,206.25.
86. Section 2(e).
87. When the Government uses the product directly in the tasks of wvar or as a
part of Lend-Lease shipments, the problem of uneven cost conditions to subsequent
purchasers is avoided.
88. For previous experience in the application cof these techniques see HAnI,,
WARTIME CONTROL OF PICE.S (1940) 180; MULLENnoRE, HISTORY OF U. S. Fcn AD-
mIISTRATION (1941).
89. Similar to the questions involved in handling high cost marginal producer,
are the problems arising out of differentials between foreign and domestic prices.
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Retail Prices. Retail price fixing raises somewhat different problems from
those confronted in setting prices for raw materials or manufactured goods.
There is first the broad question of whether normal channels of retail trade
should be preserved.00 As the war progresses, it seems clear that these chan-
nels will to some extent require modification."' Furthermore, underlying all
decisions concerning retail price setting is the thorny question whether to
fix resale prices on the basis of costs of performing the various marketing
functions; or whether to fix them in terms of the "customary differential"
approach based on actual previous market prices.02 Both cost and past price
will no doubt be employed. The difficulty in applying the cost approach is
that variations in distributive functions make it extremely hard to compute
costs for an individual retailer. Finally, additional differences in the problem
of retail price regulation are introduced by the multiplicity of items and the
great diversity in types of retail outlets.0 8
Up to the present, retail prices have not been directly fixed except in a
few special instances. To keep retailers in line, reliance has been placed
on consumer education and cooperation with retail trade associations; also
an effort has been made to eliminate scare advertising and to bring about
standardization of products. 94  It is becoming increasingly apparent, how-
ever, that when prices are fixed for the pre-retail steps in the marketing
process, prices must also be stabilized for the retail stages, if the retailer is
Already OPA has experienced trouble when foreign prices of imported products rose
above domestic ceilings. See OPA Price Schedule No. 8, Nickel Scrap, 3 C. C. H.
1941 War Serv. %143,208, for a provision encouraging imports. The present policy of
the Board of Economic Warfare, in controlling exports by licensing, in effect enjoins
any export sale where a price exceeds an official ceiling. See 54 STAr, 714, 50 U. S. C.
§ 701 (app.) (1940). The Board's Price Control Committee is endeavoring to establish
fair differentials for the added cost of exporting goods. See generally Board of Economic
Warfare Press Release No. 28, Feb. 2, 1942; Office of Export Control, Current Control
Bulletin No. 7 (1942).
90. Section 2(h) provides that the powers in the Act shall not be used to compel
changes in "methods, or means or aids to distribution" except to prevent evasion.
91. In the use of rationing, adequate enforcement may require changes in estab.
lished methods of distribution. There is good reason to believe that rationing will be
extended beyond automobiles, rubber products, typewriters and sugar.
92. Market prices, as indicative of consumer acceptability of the product, are
functions of such factors as location, personal appeal, credit terms and cost differenceq.
See KAULLA, THEORY OF THE JUST PRICE (1940) 213-14.
93. The pros and cons of this are discussed in Abramson & Phillips, Retail Price
Control (1942) 20 HARV. Bus. REv. 184. This is one of the best statements of retail
price fixing problems. See also MULLENDORE, HISrORv OF THlE U. S. FooD Attmis-
TRATION (1941); P. W. GARRETr, GOVERNMENT CONTROL OVER PlICFS (1920).
94. Standardization or simplification serves at least a four-fold function: (1) it
makes the mechanics of price fixing easier; (2) price evasion by change of quality is
reduced; (3) simplifying commodities makes for lower costs and hence lower prices;
(4) where supply of material is limited, it fosters greater per capita distribution.
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not to exact a toll for his strategic position. More adequate enforcement
as provided in the new Act points the way toward extension of price fixing
to the retail level.9 5
Agricultural Prices. Perhaps the most serious danger to successful con-
trol of prices is the provision in the statute governing setting of prices for
farm products. While no floor is explicitly set under agricultural prices,
no maximum price is to be established below the highest of four possible
prices. These are: (1) 110 per cent of parity90 price adjusted for grade,
location and seasonal differentials ;9 (2) the market price prevailing for
such commodity on October 1, 1941; (3) the market price prevailing for
such commodity on December 15, 1941; or (4) the average price for such
commodity during the period July 1, 1919, to June 30, 1929. Discouraging
comparisons can be made between agricultural prices before the statute and
what they might be assuming prices are set in terms of the highest of the
four standards. Since parity increases with each increase in the price of
items purchased by farmers, its use as a minimum standard accelerates the
spiral of inflation. Of course the maximum prices can be set above any
of these standards, and with action by OPA in the field of agricultural prices
requiring final approval by the Secretary of Agriculture,08 even these high
levels may be disregarded. While food may win the war and write the
peace,99 it is apparent that politics is interfering with application of an intelli-
gent and strategic food policy in the suppression of unwarranted price
advances.
Status of Contracts and Escalator Clauses. Unless the pertinent schedule
makes an exception, the Act invalidates an executory contract providing for
95. As in the last war, enforcement and supervision of retail price fixing will
largely be decentralized. Licensing and conspicuous posting of "fair price" lists by
retailers will be revived.
96. Parity is not a dollar and cents figure but a formula expressing a relatk, n
between the price of what the farmer sells and what he buys. See Stein. Parity: I'hat
is it? (1941) 25 AGRICULTURAL SITUATION (U. S. Bur. Agr. Econ.) Xto. 9 at 11.
97. Section 3 (a). But under § 3(b) the parity of any agricultural commudity other
than the basic crops can be modified if the production and consumption of the cummudity
has so changed since the base period as to result in a price out of line with parity
prices for basic commodities.
98. Section 3(e). The President can no doubt influence the use of the veto p ver.
See statement of the President upon signing the act. N. Y. Times, Jan. 31, 1942, p. 26,
col. 1. The Price Act does not prohibit the release of stocks held by the Commodity
Credit Corporation; this power can be used to reduce some farm prices below any of
these four possible levels. See joint statement of Secretar. of .Agriculture and the
Price Administrator, OPA Release No. PM-2380, Feb. 3, 1942.
99. Wickard, The Job of Northeastent Agriculture in National Dclense, U. S.
Dep't of Agr., Sept. 24, 1941 (mimeographed); Wickard, Food for War and Peace
(1941) 105 Nav REPUBLIc 818.
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a price in excess of a ceiling established after the contract was made,100
This'confronts business with an added problem in forward pricing for future
delivery. Normally management seeks some measure of protection in mak-
ing forward prices; the general practise has been to use various types of
escalator clauses ranging from those empowering the producer to raise the
price at the time of delivery by any necessary amount, to those providing
for adjustment of costs on the basis of Bureau of Labor Statistics indices
of material prices and average hourly wages.
From the standpoint of controlling inflation, the escalator clause generally,
and some forms in particular, faces several basic objections. It is likely to
result in price increases in excess of cost increases, for the rates of wages
and material prices prevailing at the time of delivery may not reflect actual
costs during the course of manufacture due to the lapse of time. Secondly,
the escalator clause may eliminate the incentive to economize and may furnish
a means of padding costs. Third, the clause accelerates the vicious upward
spiral which makes inflation exceedingly difficult to control. Under the
emergency legislation, an escalator clause which operates to hoist price above
the ceiling is invalid and unenforceable. A partial solution of the problem
of forward pricing would be adjustment of the ceiling by OPA when cost
experience has demonstrated that the old ceiling is no longer equitable,
Sellers could then protect themselves in part by inserting a clause in the
sales contract providing that if the ceiling is raised by OPA, the contract
price could be revised upward, subject to the purchaser's right to cancel.101
Procurement and Prices. With the size of Government purchasing reach-
ing astronomical proportions, failure on the part of the Government as a
buyer to adhere generally to established price ceilings can nullify the bene-
ficial effects of price fixing.10 Fortunately, the inflationary tendency of
100. Section 4(a). The priorities legislation is a clear indication of the Govern-
ment's power to invalidate existing contract relations. As to the status of contracts
before the Price Act see Mawhinney v. Millbrook Woolen Mills, 231 N. Y. 290, 132
N. E. 93 (1921); Roxford Knitting Co. v. Moore & Tierney, 265 F. 177 (C. C. A
2d, 1920), cert. denied, 253 U. S. 498 (1920) ; Boret v. Vogelstein & Co., 188 App. Div.
605, 177 N. Y. Supp. 402 (lst Dep't 1919), aff'd, 230 N. Y. 573, 130 N. E. 899 (1920) ;
Ross Lumber Co. v. Hughes Lumber Co., 264 F. 757 (C. C. A. 5th, 1920), cerl, denied,
254 U. S. 635 (1920).
101. See OPA Price Schedule No. 67, New Machine Tools, 3 C. C. H. 1942 War
Serv. f 43,267; OPA Temporary Price Regulation No. 6, Canned Fruits and Vegetables,
3 C. C. H. 1942 War Serv. 145,006.
102. Where there is a price ceiling in operation, it is inconsistent with a policy of
price control for a seller whose goods have been requisitioned to obtain a price higher
than the ceiling. The price to be paid for requisitioned goods is defined as a fair
compensation based on market value, and it is determined by the requisitioning authority
subject to judicial review. See 55 STAT. 742, 50 U. S. C. A. § 721 (Supp. 1941). it
some past cases courts in arriving at a fair market value have given little weight to
domestic price schedules. See United States v. New River Collieries, 262 U. S. 341
(1923). Today in view of the greater finality accorded administrative determinations,
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numerous uncoordinated Government purchasers which featured the last war
effort has been largely avoided. But even assuming all integrated buying
organization, the pressure to spend prodigious sums of money in a hurry
and necessity for speedy procurement creates a situation in which some
neglect of price ceilings may be inevitable." 3
There are, however, a number of techniques in procurement that can be
employed to lower prices or to restrain their rise. Under nornal conditions
considerable reliance is placed on open competitive bidding. However, while
open competitive bidding has certain advantages, it is not the equivalent Id
competition as an effective regulatory device.'"4 Consequently it is frequently
preferable now to use open market purchases or negotiated contracts.io 5 In
addition, incentives to minimize the cost of performance of a contract are
useful, if the bonus or penalty clauses are based on estimates better than
sheer guesswork. Upward movement of prices can be restrained, moreover,
*by strategic timing of invitations to bid and of delivery dates, or by increasing
the number of suppliers and by modifying specifications. Other savings can
be accomplished by utilizing existing stocks, by rejecting bids of speculators,
and allowance of split awards. Relaxation of tariffs and "Buy American"
campaigns, and development of new methods for control of storage and distri-
bution are also means to the same end. Finally, a premium is placed on the
maintenance of an honest, well-informed purchasing staff with an adequate
auditing system at its disposal.
Price and Priorities. Price and priorities are alternate methods of allo-
cating materials to different parts of the economy. With war production
demands paramount, price tends to break down as an effective regulator.
However, by establishing price ceilings buyers are to some extent placed
on a uniform level as to price. 10° and priorities then assume the major
functions of allocation.
It is plain from this that price ceilings tend to avert the constant pressure
to evade priorities which would otherwise exist if buyers were free to bid
it is doubtful that the courts will follow prior decisions which in effect approve wartime
profiteering. See Comment, Mobilization for Defense (1940) 50 YALE I. . 250, .178.
103. The Price Act is not altogether clear as to whether a government agency is
subject to the price ceilings. See §302(h). It is desirable that the Government adhere
to price ceilings in its purchases, but where exceptions need to be made, speedy machinery
should be available *to gain clearances. For this purpose, the appeal procedure of
Procedural Regulation No. 1 is probably too slow. 3 C. C. H. 1942 War Serv. 1141,101.
104. See Henderson & Nelson, Prices, Profits and Govertnient (1941) 19 Hnv.
Bus. Rma. 389, 396-97; Comment (1942) 55 HAnv. L. REv. 427, 433.
105. By order of the War Production Board all military supply contracts must
now be placed by negotiation rather than by competitive bidding. For this order ml
for a statement of factors which shall govern placing of contracts see (19421 10 U. S. L.
WEEK 2577. Where government demand is so large as to absorb a substantial fraction
of the capacity of the industry there may be little choice of method of purchase. See
Pub. L. No. 354, 77th Cong., 2d Sess. (Dec. 18, 1941) § 201.
106. Baruch, Priorities: The Synchronizing Force (1941) 19 HAnv. Bus. REv. 261.
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up the price. To the extent, however, that specific allocation of goods re-
places priorities, price will probably be even less significant in obtaining
goods. On the other hand, priorities regulations provide that the seller need
not accept defense orders unless the price and terms of sale are those "regu-
larly established".' 0 7 This has been construed to mean that the current
price for goods sold under priority rating cannot be higher than the price
ceiling. In other words, for the duration of price regulations, a bootleg price
will not be recognized on sale of commodities under priority.""
8 Finally, as
noted before, price policy should not conflict with priorities where the latter
are designed to convert normal into wartime production.100 If decreased
production due to priorities results in higher unit costs,110 the price ceiling
should not be manipulated to offset this where it is desirable to force the
firm to cease operations or to switch into essential production,
EVASION
By and large the character of compliance N'ith price regulations so far
has been closely correlated with the nature of the industry. Where the total
number of sellers is few or where sales are primarily concentrated in the
hands of a relatively small number of sellers even though the total number
is large, the record of compliance is generally satisfactory. It is probably
true that if compliance is obtained from the largest majority of dealers
covering, for instance, ninety per cent of all transactions by volume, inflation
can be kept within controllable limits."' Unquestionably the fear of non-
compliance in some businesses has been a deterrent to forceful OPA action.
The history of prohibition enforcement and the NRA both demonstrate
convincingly that as violations increase, as the evasions of the unscrupulous
minority become contagious, the respect for government and the willingness
to comply diminish in more than proportionate measure. Moreover, it seems
clear that without effective measures designed to control volume of money
income expended, including particularly a drastic tax policy, it will be
impossible to prevent wholesale evasion of the Act.
A catalogue of the devices that can be employed to evade price schedules
would run to many pages. To cope with the many possibilities for evasion
requires both skill in formulating schedules and the use of enforcement
machinery that can police prices on a large scale. Since a price which vio-
lates a schedule is so easy to detect, dodges are likely to be concealed in the
107. Priorities Regulation No. 1, 944.2(b)(2), 3 C. C. H. 1942 War Serv.
1 30,901.11.
108. Communication to YALE LAW JOURNAL from OPM, Nov. 26, 1941.
109. See pp. 833-34 supra.
110. See note 68 supra.
111. See House Price Control Hearings at 765. In England, women detectives have
been appointed to tour shops and to haunt hairdressing establishments to gather gossip
on food violators. See House Price Control Hearings at 760.
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terms of the bargain or in other changes of normal trade practice."r - The
fiction of the quoted price 1 3 and the numerous possible concealed modi-
fications of it provide a ready method of evasion. The major outline of the
technique of control adopted by OPA is usually to insist on the freezing
of prior trade practice; in this way, a ready-made frame of reference is avail-
able for comparison. Among specific evasion techniques in recent experience
are upgrading and unofficial markets11 4 for resale and barter. Then, too,
introduction of new products not covered in the schedule is another attempted
avenue of escape from regulation. In fact, the impact of the war in forcing
reductions of quality and the use of substitute articles will make this form
of evasion widespread and difficult to check. Finally, as long as price fixing
is limited to the lower levels of the flow of goods, there is sone tendency
where feasible to retain raw materials and sell them in finished or semi-
finished form in order to place the product outside the reach of price
schedules."'
ENFORCEMENT
To secure compliance, a variety of enforcement techniques are available
in the Act. These include criminal penalties, injunctions, damages, licensing,
investigatory powers,"16 publicity, requisitioning, priorities and rationing,"
T7
and cooperation with procurement or other government departments. The
criminal sanction is applicable to any person who wilfully violates any
provision of a regulation or order, or who makes any statement or entry
false in a material respect in a required report or document. 1 s By will-
fulness is sometimes meant intentional disregard of a statute or regulation
112. Literally fifty-seven varieties of "unfair" marketing practices which were for-
bidden under the NRA codes setting minimum prices can now operate to defeat maxi-
mum price regulation. See TERBORGH. PRICE CONTROL DEVICES IN NRA Corms (1934)
33; SWEvzy, STmc'cuR OF NAZI EcoNomY (1941) 101.
113. See Till, The Fiction of the Quoted Price (1937) 4 L.%w & CONThMP. Pron. 363.
114. See N. Y. Times, Oct. 10, 1941, p. 33, col. 2 (diemicals): N. Y. Times, Oct. 16,
1941, p. 31, col. 2 (pharmaceuticals) ; N. Y. Times, Oct. 24, 1941, p. 33, col. 2 (ethyl
alcohol); N. Y. Times, Oct. 29, 1941, p. 33, col. 3 (paint-makers). In Germany intru-
sion of unnecessary middlemen called "Kettenhandel" presented a problem for price
fixers, and the same situation is not unlmown here. See Domeratzsky, Price-Control
in Germany--Policy and Technique (1941) 1 INTRm. REF. SRav. No. 19 at 2-3. Licens-
ing was the technique employed to curb this practice. CI. OPA Price Schedule No. 19,
Southern Pine Lumber, 3 C. C. H. 1941 War Serv. J43,219.
115. Haney, Price Fixing in the U. S. During the War (1919) 34 POE. Sc. Q. 104,
262, 434 at 276 et seq.; see N. Y. Times, Sept. 6, 1941, p. 25, col. 7 (cloth mills).
116. Section 202.
117. Under § 201(b), the President is authorized to transfer any of the powers and
functions relating to rationing to OPA. Operating in the opposite direction is the broad
power in the President to transfer power and functions from OPA to any other agency
having functions relating to the commodities in question. Ibid.
118. Section 205(b).
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or plain indifference to it; malice toward any of the parties or toward the
Government may not be required, but good faith is expressly made a defense
in a criminal or civil action for penalties or damages.1 9 The United States
District Courts have concurrent jurisdiction with state and territorial courts120
of enforcement proceedings.
On the civil side there is the remedy of injunction which is only bestowed
on the Administrator.' 21 In addition there is a private remedy, available to
the buyer, for $50 or treble the amount by which the consideration exceeded
the maximum price, whichever is greater. This remedy, however, is restricted
to those who buy the commodity for use or consumption other than in the
course of trade; if .the buyer is disqualified, the Administrator can bring a
similar action within a year after delivery.
To further effectuate the purposes of the Act and assure compliance,
the Administrator may issue licenses and require them as a -condition of
selling a commodity or commodities affected by any regulation or order issued
under the Act. 22 No license, however, shall contain any provision which
could not be prescribed by regulation under other sections of the Act. On
petition of the Administrator a court may suspend the license if it finds that
a violation of the license or regulation or schedule occurred after a warning
notice by registered mail had been received. The result of suspension of
a license is the withdrawal of authority to sell the commodity involved or
any commodity covered by price schedules, in which the license is a condi-
tion of selling. Within thirty days an appeal may be taken in the regular
way, and upon good cause, any order of suspension may be stayed in accord-
ance with applicable practice.
PROCEDURE
The unique nature of the administrative problem involved in fixing prices
determined to a large extent the character of the procedural framework set
up by the Act. Because schedules apply to large numbers of persons and
because of the necessity of immediate action to check rapidly rising prices,
the holding of a formal hearing is not required by the Act in the process
of setting ceilings. In addition, in considering a protest by any person sub-
ject to the regulation the Administrator need not hold a formal hearing;123
119. Section 205(d). See United States v. Illinois Cent. Ry., 303 U. S. 239, 243
(1938).
120. Section 205(c). But in licensing proceedings, the Federal District Courts only
take jurisdiction if the licensee does business in more, than one state or if his gross sales
exceed $100,000. See § 205 (f) (2).
121. Section 205(a).
122. Section 205(f).
123. The proceedings at the stage of considering a protest may be limited to a written
hearing in the form of affidavits, or other written evidence, and the filing of briefs. See-
tion 203(c). OPA Procedural Regulation No. 1, 3 C. C. H. 1942 War Serv. 141,101,
provides for the details and variations on procedure. Since the Act is not explicit about
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but if he denies the protest, he is required to inform the protestant of the
grounds for his decision.12 4 Any person aggrieved by denial of any part
of his protest may file a complaint with the newly created Emergency Court
of Appeals. The Administrator, when a complaint has been served upon
him, certifies and files with the court a transcript of proceedings in connec-
tion with the protest including a statement indicating the economic and other
facts of which he has taken official notice.1'5 Treating the price order as
quasi-legislative action the court is directed to set aside the order in whole
or in part if it is not in accordance with law, or is arbitrary or capricious.'2
From the decision of this court a petition for writ of certiorari may lie filed
in the Supreme Court of the United States.2
7
In addition to this general framework of procedure there are miscellaneous
provisions designed to facilitate speed and unity of action in dealing with
problems of price fixing. For example, neither the Emergency Court nor
any other court shall have jurisdiction to stay the effectiveness of any ceiling
order.1 2 8 Furthermore, the jurisdiction of the Emergency Court over the
question of validity of price orders is to be exclusive. 12 9 Thus, by the terms
of the statute, the defendant in an enforcement proceeding in the state or
district courts may not raise as a defense invalidity of the price order.
While the procedural innovations in the Act present a number of inter-
esting questions, the most serious constitutional problem would seem to
hinge on whether Congress can go so far as to deprive the District Courts
of power to pass on the validity of price orders in enforcement proceed-
procedure for obtaining individual adjustments and exceptions as provided for in § 2(c),
it may be argued that the right to have an exception made in behalf of an individual can
be withdrawn by the OPA. But because of the possibility of error in formulating a ceil-
ing or because economic warfare or Government purchasing require exceptions in special
cases, there should be quick relief available without challenging the validity of the order
as it applies to the majority of firms. See note 72 supra. Absence of a requirement of
notice and hearing preparatory to exercise of delegated legislative power is probably not
unconstitutional, although a number of Federal statutes have required it. See Bi-Metal-
lic Investment Co. v. Colorado, 239 U. S. 441 (1915); Buttfield v. Stranaln, 192 U. S.
470 (1904).
124. Section 203(a). This change from the original bill adds a judicial tone to the
hybrid procedure which partakes of both judicial and legislative qualities.
125. Section 203(b). See Gellhorn, Offlcial Notice in Adminislrative Adjudication
(1941) 20 TEx. L. REv. 141, on the general problem.
126. Section 205(b). See Pacific States Box & Basket Co. v. White, 296 U. S. 176
(1935). Any hearings or proceedings held in connectiun with the formulation of a
schedule or the protest to it are said to resemble legiblative hearings. See House Price
Control Hearings at 336; Senate Price Control learings at 243.
127. Section 204(d).
128. Sections 204(c) & (d). It would be highly impractical to permit widely scat-
tered courts to create haphazard geographical price disparities by use of the injunction.
See Lauf v- E. G. Skinner & Co., 303 U. S. 323 (1938). But see .Mountain States Power
Co. v. Pub. Serv. Comm. of Mont., 299 U. S. 167 (1936).
129. Sections 204(a) & (d).
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ings. Although Congress may place exclusive jurisdiction of certain pro-
ceedings in special tribunals, here there is the difference that jurisdiction is
given to a district court for some causes of action, yet the important, related
judicial function of passing on the validity of the order is denied to these
same courts.130 It may be argued that an adequate remedy for a violator
exists in the Emergency Court; but even there, since validity of a schedule
depends on facts concerning an entire industry, a single violator in that in-
dustry may be in no position adequately to contest a price order."' In any
event, denial to a violator of the defense of invalidity of the price order
may be a serious impairment of his defenses.
CONCLUSION
In discussing inflation, it should be emphasized that inflation itself, in the
sense of an arbitrary increase in the supply of money, is not an evil, but
a powerful weapon for increasing employment and real income. From the
point of view of the bottom of a depression, all recovery is inflationary.
Inflation becomes a social danger only after recovery has proceeded to a
point of high employment and shortages of labor and materials.
It is quite apparent that inflation in this latter sense has not been pre-
vented, and it remains to be seen whether the stresses of a war economy
can be so cushioned as to avoid its more extreme effects. Perhaps a recur-
rence to some of the mistakes made during the last war may throw light on
the probabilities of present success. Marked by belated action, by lack of
unified authority and by crude weapons of enforcement, non-statutory price
fixing was severely handicapped.' 32 Too frequently the costs of high cost
producers were determinative in setting prices for a whole industry. Also
inflationary was the competition among governmental and military buyers
for the material of war. Moreover, the failure to coordinate fiscal and credit
controls with price policy was a fundamental impediment to more effective
price fixing. By no means the least of the errors was the removal of price
130. Note that under § 204(d) the regular courts still have power to pass on the con-
stitutionality of the terms of the statute. See Marbury v. Madison, 1 Cranch 137 (U. S.
1803) ; Lent v. Tillson, 140 U. S. 316 (1891) ; Kuhnert v. United States, 36 F. Supp.
798 (D. C. Mo. 1941) ; ef. Myers v. Bethlehem Shipbldg. Co., 303 U. S. 41 (1938) ; see
McAllister, Statutory Roads to Review of Federal Administrative Orders (1940) 28
CALIF. L. REv. 129.
131. The present court has been particularly solicitous of the rights of a criminal.
See Walker v. Johnston, 312 U. S. 275 (1941) ; Weiss v. United States, 308 U. S. 321
(1939); Nardone v. United States, 302 U. S. 379 (1937).
132. For description of the weaknesses see Haney, Price Fixing in the U. S. Durbigu
the War (1919) 34 POL. ScL Q. 104, 262, 434 at 446; HARDY, WARTIME CONTRO. OP'
PaicEs (1940) 210; Taussig, Price Fixing as Seen By a Price Fixer (1919) 33 Q. J.
Ecom 205.
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fixing upon the cessation of hostilities; this alone led to a 23 per cent
increase in prices.'
33
Some of these defects have been avoided thus far; others still threaten
our ability to cope with runaway prices.134 Somewhat encouraging has been
the manner in which metals and industrial chemicals have been relatively
orderly and stable in the recent past by contrast with the very serious price
problem they created in 1916.1-5 While farm prices have risen more than
in the last war they were already at the parity level at the inception of
World War I. But the weak statutory control over farm prices and the
failure to stabilize wages are not reassuring. 13 6 It remains to be seen whether
the inadequacies of our tax policy, financing policy and production policy
are so great as to put an impossible burden on our price fixing plans. Cer-
tainly if consumers' money incomes are twenty per cent greater in 1942
than in 1941,137 and if the quantity of goods available for consumers remains
constant or declines somewhat, the pressure for price increases will be hard
to resist and price ceilings almost impossible to enforce. 138 It is plain that
present plans are not adequate for the problem and that if prices are to be
effectively controlled more drastic means of reducing the amount of income
available for consumption should be instituted immediately.'tm
133. See House Price Control Hearings at 345.
134. Under existing conditions jurisdictional disputes among and within Government
agencies have no more justification than their counterpart in organized labor. See Sroeav,
BusiN'xss As UsuAL (1941).
135. In the first World War, metals rose 54 per cent within a few months; OPA
has succeeded in keeping metal prices from rising more than 11 per cent. Foad costs
have already gone up 21 per cent. See OPA Release No. P1-2312, Jan. 26, 194?; N. Y.
Times, Nov. 9, 1941, § 4, p. 8, col. 3. For a comparison of price rises in commodities
and foods between the last war and this one see charts in Special Report on 1942
Revenue Bill, C. C. H. Standard Federal Tax Serv. at 17.
136. See p. 826 supra.
137. Economists of the Commerce Department estimate that national income in 1942
will reach 113 billion, an increase of eighteen and a half billion, or about 19.6 per cent
over 1941. They also predict a rise in the general price level oi twelve per cent. See
N. Y. Times, March 8, 1942, § 1, p. 39, col. 4.
138. Rationing offers an additional, more drastic control. See Drucker, We Must
Accept Rationing (1941) 184 HAPER's MAGAZINE 1. Great Britain has adopted a
program of rationing. Crowther, How Britain F ghts Inflation (1942) 106 N%.:
REPUBLIc 74.
139. This means that the chances for success in our efforts to control inflation depend
not upon the Office of Price Administration alone, but also in part upon the 1942 Tax
Statutes. If they penalize consumer incomes, in favor of corporate and individual
savings, and do so in a forthright way, we will be allowed to hope that war financing
will not be an unmixed economic evil. See Letter to Editor from Gustav Stolper,
N. Y. Times, March 15, 1942, § 4, p. 8, col. 5.
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